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Thou Good and Faithful Servant

by Carl E. Schneider

L

awmakers are stewards of social
resources. A current debate-over
screening newborns for genetic
disorders-illuminates dilemmas of
that stewardship that have particularly
plagued bioethics. Recently in the Report, Mary Ann Baily and Thomas
Murray told the story oflittle Ben Haygood. He died from MCADD, a genetic disorder that can make long fasting
fatal. 1 Screening at birth would have let
doctors alert Ben's parents. "After Ben
died," Baily and Murray wrote, "his father became a passionate advocate for
expanding Mississippi's newborn
screening program to add MCADD
and other disorders." Soon, the Ben
Haygood Comprehensive Newborn
Screening Act increased the number of
genetic disorders covered by the state's
program from five to forty and provided
teams to follow up positive tests.
Is this a prudent and productive way
to make public policy? Certainly it is
understandable. Mr. Haywood knew
that parents suffered and children died
in ways newborn screening could prevent. He acted on his knowledge. The
legislature knew that suffering and
death could be prevented. It acted on its
knowledge. Was it supposed to let Tiny
Tim die?
Who could say yes? But was the legislature a good steward? In its first year,
as Baily and Murray reported, Mississippi's expanded screening identified
three cases of MCADD "along with
twelve cases of other new disorders, out
of a total of 116 newborn screening diagnoses." But "to help pay for the ex-

pansion, the state doubled the [screening] fee to seventy dollars. This meant
that a substantial share of the resources
for expansion came from Mississippi's
Medicaid funds, since Medicaid covers
more than half of Mississippi births."
Around this time, Mississippi's infant
mortality rate had been increasing,
"Medicaid eligibility requirements were
tightened, and some programs were
cut."
One county's infant mortality rate,
however, "fell sharply after a private
charity began providing intensive inhome visits using local women as counselors and busing pregnant black
women to pre- and postnatal classes." If
resources spent screening had instead
been spent on such a program, would
more lives have been saved and more
suffering averted? When legislators are
confronted with the tragedy and passion of a parent like Mr. Haygood, such
questions are painful and seem pointless. But if they are not asked, several
anonymous Tiny Tims may die to save
one whose story lawmakers hear.
The American College of Medical
Genetics proffers a somewhat more systematic way to make screening policy. 2
Its "expert panel identified 29 conditions for which screening should be
mandated. An additional 25 conditions
were identified because they are part of
the differential diagnosis of a condition
in the core panel or are clinically significant and revealed by the screening
technology but lack an efficacious treatment ... or because there are incidental

findings for which there is potential
clinical significance."
The ACMG report is a stride toward
more orderly stewardship, and most
states have implemented a version of the
report's proposals. But like Mr. Haygood, the ACMG has purposes and passions that lead it to see a world in which
screening is indispensable. Its report
does address the issue of cost and benefit, but in such a cautiously qualified
way that it's hard to embrace its conclusions. Furthermore, the report enthusiastically says that "screening is more
than testing. It is a coordinated and
comprehensive system consisting of education, screening, follow-up, diagnosis,
treatment and management, and program evaluation." How would a "comprehensive system'' affect costs and benefits? Finally, the report does not ask
whether there are yet more rewarding
ends to which resources could be put.
In a recent white paper, the President's Council on Bioethics sees screening from yet another perspective. 3 It
finds the cost question harder than the
ACMG. Few infants actually benefit:
Of about four million babies screened
annually, "about 5,000 are identified as
having serious heritable disorders, most
of which are, in varying degrees,
amenable to treatment." And the "benefits and harms involved in each component of genetic screening" are "complex and elusive."
The white paper, however, is primarily interested in "ethical analysis" of
screening. The white paper "[r]eaffirms
the essential validity" of the "classical
principle"-screen only for treatable
diseases. It believes the ACMG report
strays from that principle. First, the report favors screening for untreatable
disorders if screening might produce
clinically useful information. Second,
the white paper concludes that the report embraces "a broadened conception of
benefit that includes ... helping society
by providing opportunities for biomedical research aimed at understanding the
natural history of the disorder and finding an effective treatment for it."
The white paper thus recommends
mandatory screening "only for those
disorders that clearly meet" the "treat-
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able" standard. Screening for other disorders "may be offered by the states to
parents on a voluntary basis under a research paradigm." The "research"
screening would have to meet two requirements. First, "[p] articipation in
these pilot studies should require the
voluntary, informed consent of the infant's parents." Second, "IRB approval
should be obtained in each state."
The white paper's perspective, then,
is essentially that of traditional
bioethics. It focuses on the interests of
the patient, fears that research may injure those interests, and treats informed
consent and IRB review as presumptively desirable. How does that perspective
look to the good steward?
When the state makes screening policy, it not only allocates its funds; it also
shapes the way parents employ their
time, energy, money, and medical services. Parents asked to give informed
consent must devote those resources to
their education. Were screening all that
new parents had to learn about, imposing that education on them could make
sense. But new parents have more pressing assignments. When I asked a family
practice physician where screening
ranked in his educational priorities for
new parents, he snorted. He is anxious
to teach parents to bring newborns in
for attention when they have a fever,
not to give babies water, to put babies to
sleep on their backs, and much else that
is not obvious and saves lives.
Requiring parents to spend resources
learning about screening looks even less
sensible given the sobering but evermounting evidence that informed consent cannot achieve the goal announced
for it--equipping people to reason their
way capably to well-founded and wellconsidered medical decisions. And the
white paper presents evidence that education about screening is, if anything,
particularly ineffective. But of course:
Teaching and learning are hard. Good
stewards of educational resources
choose their battles cautiously.
The good legislative steward asks another question: If screening is needed,
how should it be instituted? The issue is
not whether parents may exempt children from screening. It is whether the
january-February 2009

rule should be that children are
screened unless their parents opt out, or
that children are not screened unless
their parents opt in. A large literature
tells us that even when people care
about a decision (like contributing to
retirement accounts), they frequently
leave themselves wherever default rules
put them.
So which default rule best suits
screening? That depends on two things.
First, which rule best reflects parents'
preferences? That is, which rule is likeliest to leave parents where they want to
be? The white paper shows that given a
choice, in surveys and in life, almost all
parents choose screening. So an opt-out
rule both conserves social and personal
resources and promotes parents' autonomy (by giving them what they want
without making them ask).
The second question about defaults
is which rule best promotes broader social interests. The arguments for screening are that it protects newborns and
their families while promoting valuable
research. If so, the opt-out rule is again
preferable. Furthermore, an opt-out
rule attributes to parents a willingness
to assist medical research when the risk
is vanishingly small. That rule assumes
parents recognize that their families
benefit from generations of participation in research and can repay their debt
by participating in research to help later
generations. An opt-out rule thus honors the American tradition Tocqueville
admired:
The free institutions which the inhabitants of the United States possess, and the political rights of
which they make so much use, remind every citizen, and in a thousand ways, that he lives in society.
They every instant impress upon
his mind the notion that it is the
duty as well as the interest of men
to make themselves useful to their
fellow creatures; and as he sees no
particular ground of animosity to
them, since he is never either their
master or their slave, his heart readily leans to the side of kindness.

story is told that seems to reveal a dreadful wrong. Sympathy is won. Indignation is provoked. An "obvious" solution
presents itsel£ The legislature adopts the
solution without systematic argument
or adequate evidence. For example, a
federal ban on "drive-through deliveries" was enacted in this way. Congress
barely discussed the Patient Self Determination Act's (otiose) requirement that
information about advance directives be
offered patients. When the Department
of Health and Human Services promulgated HIPAA, it proffered more anecdotes than rationales for aggrandizing
its authority. The IRB system continues
to be justified primarily by a rhetoric of
scandal that has less and less relevance.
Newborn screening illustrates
Wilde's mot: "The truth is rarely pure
and never simple." Facts are elusive and
ambiguous, yet until they are understood, principles provide little guidance.
We value good stewardship, but we do
not know what the real costs and benefits of screening are. The people and
groups that are interested in policy have
perspectives of their own. Legitimately.
Mr. Haygood should think about families like his; the ACMG should look to
genetics to improve health; the President's Council should analyze issues in
ethical terms. But all these perspectives
are necessary, and who is to assemble,
evaluate, and reconcile them? So bad
money drives out good, and argument
by anecdote, by scandal, and by outrage
perpetually threatens to displace the
burdensome and perplexing business of
good stewardship.
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Much law is made in the way the
Haygood Act apparently exemplifies. A
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